![]() Unless you have the mythical quantum computer at your disposal, or crack "The A Register" password server database, you are not going to crack mine any time soon. ![]() So, good enough for the people, but not (US) national security? ‘‘(e) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.-(1) The authorities of the Director described in para-graphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall be delegated to the Sec-retary of Defense in the case of systems described in paragraph (2) and to the Director of National Intelligence in the case of systems described in paragraph (3). ‘‘(d) NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS.-Except for the authorities and functions described in subsection (a)(5) and subsection (c), the authorities and functions of the Director and the Secretary under this section shall not apply to national security systems. Authority and functions of the Director and the Secretary:. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. "This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the (), Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. It's in the front matter, quoting from NIST 800-90b:. ![]() Unfortunately, short of building things yourself, by hand, from discrete transistors, there's really no way to trust something for this purpose.Īctually NIST doesn't. Your "TrueRNG" could easily have similar weaknesses even if the onboard entropy source is truly random, the commodity microcontroller presenting the USB interface could easily be vulnerable in any number of ways. Especially if the implementer is Intel who most people reasonably believe accommodate NSA backdoor requests. But this is exactly why no one trusts this type of implementation: it's too easy for malicious actors to alter just one thing and compromise millions of machines, and the semiconductor manufacturers' insistence on secrecy makes the delivered implementation unauditable. Microcode would be, in many implementations. "given the systematic weakening of encryption (the "accidental" choice of weak elliptic curve parameters in sample code, for example) without a lot of testing we'd neer know if the thing hadn't been compromsed either in the design or somewhere in the firmware."įirmware isn't in play here. Many have even been "independently audited". Arm implementations with TrustZone have a TRNG built in. "I'm actually surprised that we don't have them built into the architecture of every computer." Re: If you value your security get a hardware random number generator - or two I'm actually surprised that we don't have them built into the architecture of every computer but then given the systematic weakening of encryption (the "accidental" choice of weak elliptic curve parameters in sample code, for example) without a lot of testing we'd neer know if the thing hadn't been compromsed either in the design or somewhere in the firmware. They work on a well known principle - differencing two random noise streams (I beleive it was the mechanism used in the original ERNIE). Quite respectable hardware random number generators are cheap, the one I have ("TrueRNG") cost about $50 and is a USB dongle. If you value your security get a hardware random number generator - or twoĪlthough the RNG algoritm used in our computers is, well, pretty random its really not secure for situations where you really need it to be secure - at best its going to be some kind of pseudo random number generator seeded with some number derived from a source like the time between two keypresses (or just the time).
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |